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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KENNETH K. BRADFORD and
TAM.MY BRADFORD, his wife,
PlaintiffsAppellants,
vs.
MICHAEL ALVEY and
VAUGHN ALVEY, d/b/a
C. HOWARD ALVEY & SONS,
a Partnership; and
MICHAELE. CROWLEY, a
General Partner, d/b/a
MICRO INVESTMENT, a Utah
Limited Partnership,

Case No. 16829

DefendantsRespondents.

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLAN'I'S' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Kenneth Bradford,
seek specific performance, or in the alternative, damages
for breach of an agreement in the form of an Earnest Money
Receipt And Offer To Purchase (Exhibit 1).
DISPOSI'i"ION IN l'HE LOWER COURT
1

The court below held that a condition precedent to the
subject agreement becoming binding never occurred.

The court
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found that Mr. and Mrs. Bradford "failed to reasonably pursue
the financing," and thus found for the Defendants-Respondents,
"no cause of action."

(R. 172 I

225-232)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Mr. and Mrs. Bradford, Appellants, seek to have the
judgment for Defendants-Respondents reversed and remanded for
a determination of costs and attorney's fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. and Mrs. Bradford have been married for nearly
four years.

They have three children.

Mr. Bradford has been

a letter carrier for the U. S. Postal Service for about the
last four and one-half years.

(R.

369)

In February of 1978, they were in the market for a
new home for their expanding family.

They drove through the

Shiloh subdivision in West Jordan, Utah.

Interested in pur-

ob

chasing in that area, they took down a name and telephone
number from a sign that was posted in the subdivision. {R. 372)
The sign indicated that Midvalley Investment was market-

~

.

'

ing the subdivision.

Mr. Bradford called the number and

talked with Michael Herzog, real estate agent for Midvalley.
Mr. Herzog visited Mr. and Mrs. Bradford in their home, at
which time he prepared and they signed the Earnest Money
Receipt, Exhibit "l," to purchase Lot 95 Shiloh Subdivision,
West Jordan, Utah.

(R. 3 7 2)
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This was on or about February 17, 1978.

The Earnest

Money was accepted by Respondents Michael and Vaughn Alvey
for Midvalley on or about February 22, 1978.

The agreement

was expressly made "sale subject to buyer obtaining financing
(FHA)."

(Exhibit 1).

Said Respondents, Alveys, never had

any direct contact with either Mr. and Mrs. Bradford.
(R. 404, 415, 493, 495)
During all times pertinent hereto, Midvalley Investment's offices were located in
offices of Respondencts-Alveys.

th~

same building as the

(R. 382, 383)

Also, Respon-

dents Michael Alvey and Vaughn Alvey were the vice president/
treasurer and president/secretary, respectively, of Midvalley.
(R.

374

I

450)

A few days after the Earnest Money Receipt, Exhibit "l"
was signed, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford were taken by Mr. Herzog
to American Home Mortgage.

The reason for the meeting was to

obtain a "pre-qualification" for a loan conunitment.

(R. 375)

Mr. Herzog told Mr. and Mrs. Bradford to pursue the loan to
the extent of keeping American Home Mortgage aware of their
continued interest.

(R. 278, 279, 413, 414)

[As preferred by the subsequent affidavits of Michael
Herzog and Mr. Bradford, and as set forth in the deposition
of Mr. Bradford, Mr. Bradford was told he could not get a
loan conunitment until the home was nearly completed:
(R. 194-199

I

281, 282)

(Note:

This testimony was disallowed
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at trial on the ground of hearsay.

That this was prejudicial

error will be set forth below.)]
Barney Alvey is the brother of the Respondents Alveys.
He was the general foreman for these Respondents in the construction of the subject home.

(R. 376, 450, 451)

About a week· after Mr. and Mrs. Bradford had their
"pre-qualification" at Arnerican Home Mortgage, they met with
Barney Alvey and Michael Herzog in Midvalley Investment's
office.

The house plans were reviewed, and the Bradfords

were given Barney Alvey's home telephone number.

Mr. and

Mrs. Bradford were told to call Barney Alvey with respect to
any problems they might have with respect to the home.
(R. 376-378, 437)

At this time, Barney Alvey told the

Bradfords that the home would be completed sometime in July
or August of 1978.

Bradfords were also given a list of sup-

pliers from whom they could pick out materials for the home.
(R.

383)

Pam Tazzer was also employed by Respondents Alveys
and worked in the offices of C. Howard Alvey & Sons.
451)

(R. 383,

In late February, 1978, Mrs. Bradford discussed with

Ms. Tazzer over the telephone their choice of brick for the
subject house.

(R. 438)

.

In early March, 1978, Mr. and Mrs

Bradford met with Ms. Tazzer in the offices of Respondents
Alveys to choose their tile, tile colors and appliance
colors.

..

(R. 383, 384, 438)
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.."

In May, 1978, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford met with Barnev
Alvey at the home site.

Discussions were had at that time

regarding the problems Respondents Alveys were having in
getting the brick for the home (R. 384)
In the latter part of July, 1978, Mr. Bradford telephoned Barney Alvey at his home.

Construction of the house

was discussed including the fact that there was still a
problem in obtaining brick.

(R.

384)

In September, 1978, Mr. Bradford again telephoned
Barney Alvey at his home and asked why the home was not being
worked on and why there was no brick.

Barney Alvey stated

that there were continuing problems with Interstate Brick
Company in obtaining the brick for the home.

(R. 385, 386)

Mrs. Bradford also made repeated telephone calls to
Ms. Tazzer in March, April, May, and July of 1978.

These

were primarily for the purpose of choosing the brick, shingles,
appliances, and other such items for the house.
In July, Ms. Tazzer indicated to Mrs. Bradford that
there was still a problem getting brick, and that it would
not be available until September, 1978.

( R. 4 3 9 , 4 4 0)

In

September, 1978, Mrs. Bradford again discussed with Barney
Alvey the delay caused by the problem in getting the brick
from Interstate.

(R.

440)

In November, 1978, Mrs. Bradford

met with Ms. Tazzer in the offices of Respondents Alveys and
picked out the stone work for the house.

(R.

440)
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In October, 1978, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford sold a duplex
they owned and had been living in since prior to the execution of the subject Earnest Honey Receipt And Offer To
Purchase, Exhibit "l."
In anticipation of obtaining the money needed to get
into their new house, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford had advertised
the duplex for sale.

They received an offer which they con-

sidered to be very good and, therefore, accepted.

At this

time, they realized it would still be a substantial time
before the Shiloh house was finished.

Not wanting to lose

money paying rent, they chose to purchase another home located
at 902 Potomac, Salt Lake City, Utah.
October, 1978.

(R,

This was also in

386, 387)

In the first part of December, 1978, the Bradfords
were contacted by Respondents Alveys' office and told where
to pick out their cabinets.

Pursuant to this telephone call,

the Bradfords chose their cabinets and paid $52.00 above the
standard allowance.

(R. 392, Exhibit 8)

About one week

later, December 12, 1978, the Bradfords paid $157.00 for
extra counter-top material used in the Shiloh home.
(R. 392, 417, Exhibit 9)
In January, 1979, Mrs. Bradford called Barney Alvey
and asked him when the house would be ready as they would need
to sell their existing home.

(R. 441)

Barney Alvey told her

that the house would be ready in two months, and they should
get their existing house sold.

(R.

441)
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Sometime in the first week of February, 1979, Mr.
Bradford called Barney Alvey and asked why the house was not
being worked on.

Barney Alvey told him they (Alveys) were

finishing another house, but the Bradfords' house was next
on line to be finished.

(R. 386)

About a month later, early March, 1979, Mr. Bradford
again called Barney Alvey and told him they (Bradfords) had
sold their Murray home and would have to move within 30 days.
Barney Alvey told him the Shiloh house could probably be
finished within 30 days (R. 386)
Shortly after this, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford made a formal
application to Mason-McDuffie for an FHA loan.
on or about March 12, 1979.

(R. 345, 388)

This was

No loan com-

mitment was given on this loan application because the lending
institution did not believe the home was substantially enough
completed to order and process the needed FHA appraisal.
(R. 345)
About the first of April, 1979, and prior to the
completion of the loan application described above, Mrs.
Bradford called Respondents Alveys' offices and asked for Ms.
Tazzer.

Respondent Michael Alvey, however, got on the tele-

phone and told Mrs. Bradford that they had sold the Bradford's
contract to Respondent Crowley.
Crowley's telephone number.

Mr. Alvey gave Mrs. Bradford

Nothing was said indicating Res-

pondents were going to dishonor the contract, Exhibit 1.
(R. 442)
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After Mrs. Bradford's conversation with Respondent
Michael Alvey, Mr. Bradford telephoned Respondent Crowley.
Mr. Bradford asked about the Shiloh property.

Although Mr.

Bradford expressed a continued interest in purchasing the
house, Mr. Crowley stated he could not sell it to them for
the original contract price of $54,900.00, but would sell
it to them for $62,000.00.

(R. 394, 418, 407, Exhibit 1)

Crowley told Mr. Bradford that he thought they (Bradfords)
had had ample time to secure a loan commitment, but that they
had not done so.

As a result, Mr. Crowley stated that "infla-

tion had taken the house way past and beyond the point of
that contract."

He further stated that, "I just economicallz

could not afford to do it as a gratis program and with nothing
that I was legally bound to.

11

(Emphasis added.)

(R. 507)

Respondents Alveys had conveyed the entire subdivision
in which the subject lot and home is located to Respondent
Crowley on or about April 2, 1979.

(Exhibit 11, 12)

The

Ernest Money Receipt, Exhibit 11, includes subject Lot 95
and provides on lines 21-24, "Buyer (Crowley) to assume
Sellers (Alveys') position in all of the following . . .
(2) Sellers obligation for completion of improvements approxirnately $104,000.00.

(3) assume Sellers equity and mortgage

obligation on the following homes presently under construction
. . . 95* . . .
added.)

(*indicated the home is pre-sold)."

(Emphasis

(Exhibit 11)
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On April 30, 1979, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford filed the
Complaint initiating this action.

(R. 2)

Subsequently, in

July, 1979, Mason-McDuffie gave Mr. and Mrs. Bradford a firm
con:unitment for a $40,000.00 loan.

(R.

345, 346, 389)

Tender

of the full purchase price as per the original agreement,
Exhibit 1, was made on July 30, 1979.

(R. 390, Exhibit 10)

In May of 1979, Mr. Bradford received $17,000.00 from
his parents.

This was not listed as an obligation on the

subsequent loan application to Mason-McDuffie as there was
no firm obligation to repay these monies.
monies would be paid back
were able.

(R.

11

(R. 388)

The

if and when" Mr. and Mrs. Bradford

444)

The matter was tried to the Court on the 24th and 25th
days of September, 1979, the Honorable Dean E. Conder presiding.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MR. AND
MRS. BRADFORD FAILED TO USE REASONABLE DILIGENCE
IN OBTAINING FINANCING.
This being an action in equity, this Court reviews the
complete record, both law and facts, and passes upon the
weight and sufficiency of the evidence.

Reimain v. Baum,

115 Utah 147, 203 P.2d 387 (1949); Coombs v. Ouzounian,
24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P. 2d 356

(1970).

The evidence set forth in the record is contrary to
Findings of Fact numbered 5, as amended, 10 and 11; Conclusions of Law numbered 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9; and the
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judgment of the court below; and clearly preponderates
against the Respondents.
It is not contested that where an agreement for the
sale of real property is expressly made subject to the buyer
obtaining financing that the prospective buyer has an implied
duty to use "reasonable diligence" in seeking financing.
Sorenson v. Connelly, 536 P.2d 328 (Colo. App. 1975); Anaheim
Company v. Holcombe, 246 Ore. 541, 426 P.2d 743 (1967).
Inasmuch as all Appellants Bradfords' objections to the
lower court's findings, conclusions and judgment, except the
objection to Finding No. 5, are based upon the issue of
"reasonable diligence," this will first be discussed.

Follow-

ing this, the error in the lower court's Finding No. 5 regarding Mr. and Mrs Bradford's alleged failure to make full disclosure of debts in their loan application will be set forth.
To determine what is "reasonable diligence," all the
"facts and circumstances" of the case must be considered.
Commercial Security Bank v. Johnson, 110 Utah 342, 173 P.2d
277 (1946); Matlock v. Wheeler,

306 P.2d 325 (Okla. 1957);

Aspinwall v. Ryan, 190 Ore. 530, 226 P.2d 814

(1951);

Campbell v. Warnberg, 133 Kan. 246, 299 P. 583 (1931).
In Commercial Security Bank, supra, at p. 281, the
Court provides that

a~

agreement which fails to set forth a

time for performance must, by implication, be performed within
a "reasonable" time.

In determining what was reasonable, the

court set forth the question, "Considering all the facts and
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circumstances of this case, was

. sufficient time for a

reasonably prudent and diligent man . . .
contract? 11

[to perform the]

(Emphasis added).

This provides us with the determinative test in this
case:

whether, under the facts and circumstance of this case,

Mr. and Mrs. Bradford's efforts to obtain financing were
reasonable.
It is uncontradicted that no formal loan application
was made by Mr. and Mrs. Bradford until approximately 13
months had elapsed from the date of the execution of the
subject Earnest Money contract, Exhibit 1.

(Earnest Money

dated February 22, 1978; Mr. and Mrs. Bradford applied with
Mason-McDuffie sometime in the first part of March, 1979.)
(R. 345, 388, Exhibit 1)

The Arizona court under similar

circumstances, in considering the related issue of abandonment,
stated that the mere lapse of time was not sufficient to constitute an abandonment.

Glad Tidings Church v. Hinkley,

71 Ariz. 307, 226 P.2d 1016 (1951).

Similarly here, the

passage of time, though relevant, is not determinative .
.More importantly, the facts must be closely analyzed
to determine why

Mr. and Mrs. Bradford waited to make the

formal loan application.
Why?

Because Barney Alvey was the construction foreman

for Respondents Alveys (R. 376, 450, 451); because Barney
Alvey either by telephone or in person had discussions with
Mr. and/or Mrs. Bradford approximately every five or six
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weeks during this entire time regarding the completion of
the home (R. 376-78

I

437

I

438

I

383' 384 I

439

I

440 I

451);

because Barney Alvey told Mr. and Mrs. Bradford in February,
1978 that the home would be finished in July or August, 1978
(R. 376, 381, 437); because Barney Alvey told them completion
would be delayed because of a problem Alveys were having in
obtaining the brick, this happening first in May, then July,
and again in September, all in 1978 (R. 384-386, 440);
because Mr. and Mrs. Bradford met with Pam Tazzer and Barney
Alvey in March, 1978 to choose the tile, tile colors, appliance colors and other items for the home (R. 383, 451);
because Pam Tazzer told them in July, 1978 that there was a
problem with the brick and it would not be available until
September, 1978 (R. 439, 440); because in November, 1978,
Mrs. Bradford met with Pam Tazzer in Respondents Alveys'
offices and picked out the stone work for the house (R. 440);
because in December, 1978, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford were contacted
by Respondents Alveys' office and told where to pick out their
cabinets (which they did, paying $52 .·oo above the allowance)
(R. 392, Exhibit 8); because in December, 1978, Mr. and Mrs.
Bradford paid for purchase and installation for extra countertop material for the house (R. 392, 417; Exhibit 9); because
in January, 1979, Barney Alvey told Mr. Bradford that the
subject Shiloh home would be finished in approximately two
months, and that they should get their existing home sold
(R. 441); because in February, 1979, Barney Alvey told Mrs.
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Bradford that their home, the subject house, was next on
line to be completed (R. 386); because about the first of
March, 1979, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford, in reliance on Barney
Alvey's statements, sold the home they then owned and were
living in (R. 386); because about the first of March, 1979,
Mr. Bradford told Barney Alvey that they had sold their home,
and Barney Alvey stated he believed their new home could be
finished in 30 days

(R. 386); because their only contacts

with Respondents Alveys were through Barney Alvey and Pam
Tazzer, and no one for or on behalf of said Respondents ever
inquired or demanded from Mr. or Mrs. Bradford as to the status
of the financing nor the payment of any monies (R. 483) ; and
because the first indication of any sort which Bradfords re-

(

ceived that the Respondencts were not going to honor the sale
agreement came from Respondent Crowley on or about April,
1979 (R. 442).
[In addition to the above, were the statements of
Michael Herzog to the Bradfords to the effect that the formal
loan application need not be made until the house was near
completion (R. 194-198)

That testimony of these statements

was erroneously excluded by the lower court is more particularly set forth under Point II below.]
Under these facts, was it reasonable for Mr. and Mrs.
Bradford to postpone making their formal loan application
until March, 1979?

Certainly.

Respondents Alveys by their

actions induced Mr. and Mrs. Bradford into believing throughout
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the entire period in question that they (Alveys) were still
honoring the subject sale agreement, Exhibit 1.

Any reasonable

buyer in the place of Mr. and Mrs. Bradford would have acted
as they did.

They wanted the home very much.

Therefore,

instead of walking away when the home was not completed as
originally anticipated, they continued to work with the sellers,
expecting to close the sale at some later date.

They saw no

need to prematurely seek financing when they were unsure as
to when the home would be completed.

As soon as they were

told the new home was near completion, they not only made a
formal loan application, but sold their existing home.

They

were obviously proceeding reasonably and in good faith.
Why did Respondents repudiate the agreement?

In the

words of Respondent Crowley, "I just could not economically
afford to do it . . . . " (R. 507)

Unquestionably, prices had

increased in the one-year period since the agreement was first
executed.

Crowley, however, took the subdivision with actual

knowledge that Lot 95 had been "presold."

(Exhibit 11)

stepped into the shoes of Respondents Alveys.

He

He should have

more thoroughly examined his potential liability with respect
to the presold lots.
Mr. and Mrs. Bradford's conduct throughout has been
reasonable and prudent.

They should not be made to suffer

for Respondents' error in judgment.
To allow Respondents to back away from this agreement,
Exhibit 1, at this point would result in a manifest injustice
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to Mr. and Mrs. Bradford.

They can be made whole only by

this Court exercising its equitable duty and ordering the
Respondents to specifically perform pursuant to the original
agreement.

The judgment of the lower court should be reversed.

Finally, in awarding specific performance, the Court
should be aware that:
1.

Tender of payment by Mr. and Mrs. Bradford was

unnecessary.

Although tender of performance is normally

required, a party is relieved of this duty where the other
party repudiates the underlying agreement.

Schmidt v. Sapp,

71 Ariz. 48, 223 P.2d 403 (1950); Flagg v. Fisk, 87 N.Y.S.
530 (1904).

Also, it is so elementary as to require no cita-

tion that neither law nor equity requires one to do a vain
or futile act.

Obviously, tender after repudiation would

have been and in fact was futile; and
2.

Mr. and Mrs. Bradford appear before the Court with

"clean hands."

Respondents have consistently attempted to

paint the Bradfords with unclean hands on the basis that in
obtaining their loan commitment in July, 1979, Bradfords did
not disclose that they had received $17,000.00 from Mr.
Bradford's parents in May of 1979.
two reasons:

This is immaterial for

(a) Although Mr. Feil effectively led Mr.

Bradford in deposition into stating that he had to repay the
money, this was subsequently clarified in trial.

Hr. and

Mrs. Bradford testified that they are not under any obligation
to repay his parents, but are repaying them on an "if and
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when able" basis.
payment.

(R. 424)

(R. 444)

His parents do not expect re-

Mr. Calder of Mason-McDuffie testified

that this money would have no effect on the loan if the
applicants were not required to repay it.

(R.

347

I

348);

and (b) as previously set forth, no tender was necessary as
Respondents had repudiated the agreement.

The July 30, 1979

tender was, therefore, superfluous.
Under the circumstances of this case, Mr. and Mrs.
Bradford preceeded with reasonable diligence.

They should

be awarded specific performance and the matter remanded for
hearing on costs and attorney's fees.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
REFUSING TO ALLOW TESTIMONY BY MR. AND MRS.
BRADFORD OF CONVERSATIONS THEY HAD WITH REAL
ESTATE AGEUT .MICHAEL HERZOG.
On direct examination, after testifying that he and
Mrs. Bradford had obtained Midvalley's telephone number from
a sign in Shiloh subdivision, and that in response to a call,
Michael Herzog had come to their house and they had signed
the Earnest Money, Exhibit 1, Mr. Bradford was asked:

Q.

Were the terms of that earnest money receipt

discussed at that time with Mr. Herzog?
A.

Yes.

It was.

Q.

And referring to line 21 of that agreement,

will you read that?
A.

Says subject to buyer obtaining financing, FHA.
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Q.

How did that come to be placed in the agree-

ment?
A.

Mike Herzog told us that . . . .

(R.

372-373)

At that point, Mr. Poulton, counsel for Respondent
Crowley, objected on the basis of hearsay.

Mr. Feil, counsel

for Respondents Alveys, joined in the objection on the same
grounds.

The lower court at first overruled the objection

with respect to Respondents Alveys as the judge apparently
had mistakenly heard that Mr. Herzog was the real estate agent
for "Alvey Investment" rather than for "Midvalley Investment."
(R. 373, lines 8-29)

Upon being advised that Herzog was the

real estate agent for Midvalley rather than directly for
Alveys, the court reversed itself.

(R.

374)

The court then expressly denied counsel's contention
that Herzog was also the agent for Alveys.

(R.

374).

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Bradford testified that Mr.
Herzog took him and Mrs. Bradford to American Home Mortgage
for a pre-qualification meeting with one of the loan officers.
Mr. Bradford was asked:

Q.

Did you ever get a loan commitment from

American Home Mortgage?
We did not.

A.

No.

Q.

Why not?

A.

We were told at the pre-qualification

. . ..

At this point, both Mr. Feil and Mr. Poulton objected
on the ground of hearsay.

The objection was sustained.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-17-

(R.

375)

It was prejudicial error for the court to sustain these
objections.
A.

Michael Herzog was the agent for Respondents Alvevs

for the purposes of this transaction.
Respondents Alveys were
perty.

~he

sellers of the subject pro-

They enlisted Midvalley Investment to market the

Shiloh subdivision.

The offices of Midvalley and of Respon-

dents Alveys were located in the same building.

(R. 382)

Respondent Michael Alvey was the vice president and treasurer
of Midvalley.

Respondent Vaughn Alvey was the president and

secretary of Midvalley.

(R. 450)

Michael Herzog was the

real estate agent for Midvalley who came to Mr. and Mrs.
Bradford's home to discuss their purchasing a home in the
Shiloh subdivision.

(R. 372)

Respondents Alveys instructed

the real estate agents that brought in sale contracts to go
and aid the buyers in getting financing.

(R. 476)

In fact, Respondent Michael Alvey testified:

Q.

You never called the Bradfords and asked them

or told them they had any amount of time to obtain
financing did you, yes or no?
A.

Not directly.

Q.

Did anyone from Alvey Costruction, Yes or no?

A.

Mike Herzog was told to.

(Emphasis added.)

(R. 493)
The general rule is well established that the realtor
is the agent for the seller.

Reese v. Harper,

8 Utah 2d 119,
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329 P.2d 410

(1958)

i

Giese v. Tarp, 92 Idaho 243, 440 P.2d

521 (1968) i Bartsas Realty, Inc. v. Leverton, 82 Nev.
6'
409 p. 2d 627 (1966) i Alexander Myers & Co. , Inc. v. Hopke,
88 Wash. 2d 449, 565 p. 2d 80 (1977) i Henderson v. Johnson,
66 Wash. 2d 511, 403 p. 2d 669 (1965); Zwick v. United Farm
Agency, Inc., 556 P.2d 508

(Wyo. 1976).

The seller in this case was the Respondents Alveys.
They retained their broker-agency, Midvalley Investment, to
market the subject property.

Michael Herzog of Midvalley

discussed with Mr. and Mrs. Bradford on several occasions the
financing and completion of their home on Lot 95.

(See the

Affidavits of Michael Herzog, R. 194-196, and of Mr. Bradford,
R. 197

I

198).
It is significant to remember that the only contacts

Mr. and Mrs. Bradford had with the Respondents Alveys were
through Barney Alvey, Pam Tazzer and Michael Herzog.

During

the entire period in question, neither of Respondents Alveys
had any personal contact with either Mr. or Mrs. Bradford.
The original agreement, Exhibit 1, was made and entered into
with the realtor,.Michael Herzog, on behalf of Respondents
Alveys, negotiating it in its entirety.

Respondent Michael

Alvey testified that Mike Hergoz was told to discuss the financing with the Bradfords.

(R. 493)

Clearly, Herzog was

acting as the agent for Respondents Alveys.
But Michael Herzog is also Respondents Alveys agent
by application of the doctrine of "agency by estoppel."
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Such an agency may be created in so far as third persons
are concerned from acts and appearances which lead third persons to believe the agency has been created.

Taylor v.

United States Casualty Company, 229 S.C. 230, 925 E.2d 647
(1956).
The relevant facts set forth under the statement of
facts are clear and uncontradicted.

The offices of Midvalley

Investment and of Respondents Alveys were located in the same
building.

The Respondents Alveys were the president/secretary

and vice president/treasurer of Midvalley.

None of Respondents

Alveys ever personally made any contact with either Mr. or
Mrs. Bradford.

All negotiations and discussions on the agree-

ment, Exhibit 1, were made through Michael Herzog.

Such facts

are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that an
agency relationship existed.

Respondents Alveys should be

estopped to deny this.
B.

The statements made by Michael Herzog to Mr.

and Mrs. Bradford, which were excluded at trial, do not
constitute hearsay.
"Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a
witness while testifying at the hearing offered to prove the
truth of the matter stated is hearsay evidence

63, Utah Rules of Evidence.

"

Rule

(Emphasis added.)

As per the Affidavits of Michael Herzog and Mr. Bradford
(R. 194-198), Herzog told Mr. and Mrs. Bradford that it would
not be necessary for them to seek financing until the home was
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nearly completed.

This does not go to the truthfulness of

\

that statement.

It is relevant because it was stated and it

goes to the reasonableness of Mr. and Mrs. bradford's conduct
under the facts and circumstances of this case.

It goes to

the state of mind of the Bradfords and as circumstantial
evidence of such is an exclusion rather than exception from
the hearsay rule.

See 6 Wigmore, Evidence §1789 (Chadbourn

rev. 1976).
C.

Even if the excluded testimony was construed to

be hearsay, it is admissible under either of two exceptions
thereto.
1.

Rule 63(8) (a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence

provides that an exception to the hearsay rule is "a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement
or statements for him concerning the subject of the statement."
Significant and determinative here is the fact that Respondents
Alveys had no personal contact with either Mr. or Mrs.
Bradford.

The entire negotiations took place between Bradfords

and Herzog, Herzog acting as the representative of Respondents
Alveys.

Herzog was told to discuss financing arrangements

with the Bradfords.

Clearly, Herzog was the agent of Alveys

and was authorized to complete the negotiations on this sale.
As such, his statements are authorized admissions and are
admissible, particularly ~hose regarding financing.
2.

Even if this were not so, Herzog's statements would

still be admissible as vicarious admissions under Rule 63(9) (a)
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of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

This in effect provides that

(1) if the judge finds the declarant unavailable as a witness,
(2) the statement concerns a matter within the scope of an
agency or employment of the declarant for a party,

(3) the

statement was made before termination of the agency or employment, then (4) his statements will be admissible against
the party for whom he was the agent or employee.
Although no evidence was introduced at trial to show
the unavailability of Herzog, attempts were made to have him
subpoenaed.

The process server was unable to locate him.

More importantly, a showing of unavailability was not
necessary in this case.

The lower court made a definitive

ruling that Herzog was not the agent of Respondents Alveys.
(R. 374)

Thus, an essential element under Rule 63(9) (a),

that the declarant be an agent or employee of a party, was
found to be missing.

It would have been a vain and futile

act to show that the declarant was unavailable as the court
had already found, though based upon an erroneous holding,
that this exception was inapplicable.
The other elements under Rule 63(9()a) are clearly
met.

Herzog's statements pertained to the obtaining of

financing for the closing of the subject agreement.

This was

clearly within his agency as he alone had negotiated the
agreement with the Bradfords on behalf of Alveys and had
been expressly told by Michael Alvey to discuss financing
with the Bradfords.

Also, the statements were made during

the period Herzog was employed with Midvalley, agent for Alveys.
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D.

Proffer of evidence was unnecessary in this

instance.
It is conceded that generally the exclusion of evidence in the trial of a case will not be reviewed on appeal
unless a proper offer is made at the trial level.

Downey

State Bank v. Major Blackney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1978).
However, "offers of proof need not be made in all casses,
and will not control in all cases when made."
Estate, 33 Utah 382, 94 P. 731 (1908).

In re Young's

An offer of proof is

unnecessary where the nature of the error is otherwise clear.
Grecor Manolakos, 24 Ariz. 490, 539 P.2d 964 (1975); Gregg v.
Gregg, 469 P.2d 406

(Wyo. 1970) Taylor v. McDonald, 409 P.2d

7 6 2 (Wyo . 19 6 6 ) .
For Herzog's statements to be admissible under either
of the exceptions set forth above, Rule 63(8) (a) or 63(9) (a),
the court must find that Herzog was Respondents Alveys' agent.
Again, the court expressly found otherwise.

That this was

error is clear from the record as has been discussed under part
A above.
The court in effect held inadmissible any evidence
which required a finding of an agency relationship between
Herzog and Alveys.

In such cases, where an entire class or

type of evidence is excluded, an offer of proof is not a prerequisite for arguing the prejudicial nature of the exclusion
on appeal.

Costa v. Regents of University of California, 116
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C.A. 2d 445, 254 P.2d 85 (1953); Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal.
2d 81, 147 P.2d 604 (1944).

An offer under these circum-

stances would be an idle gesture.

Therefore, no proffer was

required.
E.

The error in excluding this testimony was substan-

tial and prejudicial.
As stated by this Court in Arnovitz v. Tella, 495 P.2d
310 (Utah 1972), an error is substantial and prejudicial if
"there would be a reasonable likelihood of a different result
in the absence of such error.''

Clearly, if Mr. and Mrs.

Bradford had been allowed to testify that they had been told
by Herzog that they need not seek financing until the home
was nearly completed, this would be a substantial factor in
analyzing the reasonableness of their conduct.

In all likeli-

hood, this would have resulted in a different result in the
lower court.
This Court should reverse the lower court on the admissibility of Herzog's statements to Bradfords and consequently
reverse the holding of that court.

Or, in the very least,

should remand this matter to the lower court for the taking
of additional evidence on the statements made by Mr. Herzog
to Mr. and Mrs. Bradford, as set forth in the Affidavits.

(R. 194-198)
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS'
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PLEADINGS
Subsequent to trial and to the issuance by the court
of its decision, counsel for Mr. and ~trs. Bradford filed a
Motion for New Trial, To Alter and Amend Judgment and For
Leave to Amend Pleadings to Confirm to the Evidence.

(R. 173)

Along with this was filed an Amended Complaint which set
forth in a new Count Five the theory of equitable estoppel.
(R.

175, 178).
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides,

in part, "When issues not raised by pleadings are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings."

In such cases, the court has no discretion

whether or not to allow the proposed amendment but must do
so.

General Insurance Company v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp.,

545 P.2d 502

(Utah 1976)

When is an issue tried by implied consent?

Where evi-

dence on that issue is introduced without objection.

In

General Insurance Company v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., supra.,
evidence concerning the circumstances of appellants executing
an indemnity agreement was introduced.
to this.

No objection was made

Appellant's counsel moved to amend their answer to

plead lack of consideration on the ground that it was necessary to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence.
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This

was denied by the trial court on the ground that lack of consideration was an affirmative defense of which the plaintiffrespondent had no notice.

On appeal, this Court overruled

the lower court by stating, "In the instant action, the evidence upon which Butchers (appellants) based their Motion to
Amend was introduced without objection, and thus, the issue
of consideration was tried by implied consent."
This Court also held in Wells v. Wells, 2 Utah 2d 241,
272 P.2d 167 (1954) at p. 170, that an amendment will be
allowed so long as "a change is not made in the liability
subject to be enforced against the defendant."
In the instant case, no additional evidence is required
to establish an estoppel.

Furthermore, allowing an amendment

to set forth estoppel in no way changes the liability sought
to be enforced against the Respondents.
Equitable estoppel arises when a party by its actions
or representations or otherwise induces another to believe
certain facts to exist, and that such other, acting with
reasonable prudence and diligence, relies and acts thereon
so that he will suffer injustice if the former is permitted
to deny the existence of such facts.

Kelly v. Richards,

95 Utah 560, 83 P.2d 731 (1938); Morgan v. Board of State
Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Utah 1976)
Respondents Alveys, through Barney Alvey, Pam Tazzer
and Michael Herzog, continually represented to the Appellants
facts and circumstances regarding the construction of the
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home on the subject property.

In January of 1979, Barney

Alvey expressly told the Appellants to sell their existing
home and get thei~ financing ready to go for the Shiloh,
subject matter, home.

Appellants' contacts and conversations

with these persons continued through March of 1979.

The only

reasonable implication from the conduct of said persons,
agents of the Respondents, is that the subject Earnest Money
Receipt and Of fer to Purchase was still being accepted by them
as valid and binding.

Respondents should have reasonably

known that the Appellants would rely on these contacts and
communications in this matter.

Appellants did reasonably

rely on these representations.

At no time were they given

notice or any impression but that the Alveys continued to
accept the said Earnest Money Receipt as being valid and binding.

Respondents should not now be allowed to deny the exis-

tence of the validity of this agreement.

To do so, would

certainly result in injustice to the Appellants.
Again, the liberal amendment policies of the courts
should have been exercised to allow amendment of the Complaint
to set forth the claim of equitable estoppel.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the lower court is contrary to the
facts of this case as set forth in the record.

Further,

it was prejudicial error to exclude testimony of conversations between Mr. Bradford and Michael Herzog.

The lower
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court also erred in denying Appellants Bradfords' Motion to
Amend Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence.

The judgment

should be reversed and Respondents ordered to perform pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Exhibit 1.
Costs and attorney's fees ·should then be assessed
against the Respondents pursuant to the terms of Exhibit 1.
The matter should be remanded to the lower court for a determination of these amounts.
In the alternative, the case should be remanded to
allow for the testimony of statements made to Mr. Bradford
by Michael Herzog to be presented and considered, and for a
finding to be made on the issue of equitable estoppel.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 28th day of .March, 1980.
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST

Gr nt A. Hurst
orney for PlaintiffsAppellants
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